Ten 'Rs' of social reaction: using social media to analyse the 'post-event' impacts of the murder of Lee Rigby by Innes, Martin et al.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=ftpv20
Download by: [Cardiff University Libraries] Date: 13 July 2016, At: 03:17
Terrorism and Political Violence
ISSN: 0954-6553 (Print) 1556-1836 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ftpv20
Ten “Rs” of social reaction: Using social media to
analyse the “post-event” impacts of the murder of
Lee Rigby
Martin Innes, Colin Roberts, Alun Preece & David Rogers
To cite this article: Martin Innes, Colin Roberts, Alun Preece & David Rogers (2016): Ten “Rs”
of social reaction: Using social media to analyse the “post-event” impacts of the murder of Lee
Rigby, Terrorism and Political Violence, DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2016.1180289
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2016.1180289
Published with license by Taylor & Francis©
2016 Martin Innes, Colin Roberts, Alun
Preece, and David Rogers.
Published online: 07 Jul 2016.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 101
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Ten “Rs” of social reaction: Using social media to analyse the
“post-event” impacts of the murder of Lee Rigby
Martin Innes, Colin Roberts, Alun Preece, and David Rogers
Cardiﬀ University Crime and Security Research Institute, School of Social Sciences, Cardiﬀ University, Cardiﬀ,
Wales, UK
ABSTRACT
This article provides a case study analysis of social reactions to the
murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby in 2013. Informed by empirical data col-
lected by systematic monitoring of social media platforms, the analysis
identiﬁes a number of online behaviours with oﬄine eﬀects—labeled
the ten “Rs”—that collectively constitute the process of social reaction to
the crime. These are deﬁned as: reporting; requesting; responding;
recruiting; “risking”; retaliating; rumouring; remembering; reheating;
and “resiliencing”. It is argued that the ability to observe these beha-
viours through the application of qualitative social media analysis has
considerable potential. Conceptually, the analysis provides new insight
into the complex and chaotic processes of sense-making and meaning
attribution that arise in the aftermath of terrorist attacks. It illuminates
how patterns of social reaction on social media are nuanced and com-
plicated, with diﬀerent segments of the public interpreting the same
developments very diﬀerently. In addition, the ﬁndings and the concep-
tual framework outlined have implications for policy and practice devel-
opment in terms of establishing a more eﬀective and evidence-based
approach to the consequence management of “post-event” conﬂict
dynamics and social reactions.
KEYWORDS
Conﬂict dynamics; counter-
terrorism; Lee Rigby; social
media; social reactions
Speaking shortly after the terrorist attacks in Paris upon the staﬀ of Charlie Hebdo
magazine in January 2015, the Director General of the UK Security Service cautioned
that future successful attacks on British soil were almost inevitable.1 It was, he elaborated,
impossible for the police and security agencies to prevent all of the plots and attempts
being brought forward. As well as delineating an ongoing sense of threat stretching into
the future, these remarks also implicitly and intriguingly highlight a neglected issue in the
terrorism studies literature.
Over the past decade there has been a signiﬁcant increase in the quantity of research on
nearly all facets of terrorism, emanating from a diverse range of disciplines. The vast
majority of these studies have, in diﬀerent ways, focused upon issues of prediction, pre-
emption, and prevention, especially with respect to individuals and groups thought likely
to engage in terrorist activities.2 However, far less is known about what happens in the
aftermath of terrorist attacks and how processes of social reaction unfold and develop. If,
as the Director General suggests, future attacks are almost inevitable, this begins to look
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like a signiﬁcant gap in our knowledge. For if you cannot prevent such incidents
happening, there would seem to be considerable public value in understanding what
happens following attacks of this kind, in order to leverage more eﬀective management
of their community impacts and consequences.
It is with this issue that the current article engages. Informed by empirical data
collected in the days, weeks, and months following the killing of Fusilier Lee Rigby in
London in 2013, it sets out an account of how processes of social reaction emerge, evolve,
and adapt. These data were collected by monitoring social media from the ﬁrst tweet from
an eyewitness at the scene of the attempted beheading on the street in Woolwich, through
to the conclusion of the court case. The dataset collected thus spans 35 million data points,
cast as digital traces of social action and emotions, to provide a high-resolution picture of
what happened following this particularly heinous killing. The point being that, certainly
compared with more orthodox research methods that can be applied to study processes of
social reaction to deﬁned events, collecting and analysing social media aﬀords a higher
resolution and more agile way of tracking and tracing how processes of social reaction
develop and evolve over time.
There have been several investigations of the Rigby case, including the application of
social media analytics. Understandably the most detailed commentary upon the case
relates to the enquiry conducted by the House of Commons Intelligence Select
Committee, which had a particular focus upon the extent of the opportunities that police
and the Security Service had to detect and interdict the two suspects.3 A rapid content
analysis of 20,000 Twitter messages to the Metropolitan Police Service in the wake of the
Rigby murder was undertaken by researchers at the think-tank Demos to ground an
argument that police organisations need to develop a “SOCMINT” (social media intelli-
gence) capability.4 Quantitative analysis also underpins the approach of Burnap et al. and
Williams and Burnap5 and their focus upon modeling the propagation of “cyber-hate” by
co-opting aspects of Cohen’s6 phases of moral panic. McEnery et al.7 provide an alter-
native, more qualitatively-inspired, methodological take on the issues, ﬁnding that main-
stream media accounts play an important role in steering and guiding the social media
conversation (but the reverse is less true). The latter point was harnessed in support of the
present work.
Compared with these previous studies though, the approach reported herein represents
the most thorough and rigorous analysis of the Rigby case conducted to date. The raw
volume of data collected, in conjunction with the duration over which it was gathered,
aﬀord unrivalled opportunities to understand how processes of social reaction, enabled by
social media communications, unfold and develop. The application of qualitative analytic
approaches to studying the whole of the case, from crime scene to court, enables the article
to identify a number of hitherto neglected aspects. This in turn aﬀords a number of new
theoretical insights and innovations in the form of ten distinct behaviours that collectively
conﬁgure the overarching process of social reaction that occurred in the aftermath of the
Rigby case. Documenting and describing these constitutes the main body of the article.
Prior to this though, a more detailed account of the research design and methodology is
provided. This includes mapping the contours of the dataset. The conclusion returns to
the policy and practice implications of generating new insights into processes of post-
event reaction. In addition, we also seek to develop a more conceptual account of why the
neglect of these issues represents a signiﬁcant oversight.
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Research design and method
At around 14:20 on May 22, 2013, a member of the public made an emergency call to the
Metropolitan Police reporting an unfolding incident in Woolwich, London. Within
14 minutes armed oﬃcers were at the scene where they shot and apprehended two
armed suspects. Lying dead in the road was the body of Fusilier Lee Rigby, whom the
two suspects had attempted to behead in what was later identiﬁed as an Islamist extremist
terrorist attack. In response to the attack the English Defence League (a Far-Right political
group) mobilized to engage in violent public disorder that night, throwing bottles and
stones at the police. Following this, for a number of weeks afterwards, mosques were
attacked and those perceived to be Muslim received insults and were subject to physical
attack in the street, including an arson attack on the Al-Rahma Islamic Centre in Muswell
Hill, London. In June and July in Walsall, Wolverhampton, and Tipton, a series of
explosive devices were detonated outside mosques—the Tipton device being packed
with nails. Pavlo Lapshyn, a White Supremacist Ukrainian student, was later charged
and convicted of those oﬀences, and with stabbing to death an elderly Muslim man in
Birmingham near the Green Lane Mosque.
From the initial incident, right through to the conclusion of the sentencing of the two
killers ten months after the initial attack, details about all of these events were being
communicated via social media platforms. At the time of the original attack the authors
were working in South London testing an experimental social media data-mining software
program called “Sentinel.” By chance, the software was collecting data when initial social
media posts ﬁrst appeared about the incident in Woolwich. Although it had never been
run at scale, given the clear signiﬁcance of the unfolding events in Woolwich, a decision
was taken to keep the collector running. By the conclusion of the suspects’ criminal trial a
total of 35 million individual pieces of social media had been collected, mostly from
Twitter.
The research-grade platform used to collect and analyse the data possesses much of the
functionality available in other similar commercial packages. However, a key feature of
Sentinel is that it is designed as a “glass” rather than “black box.” That is, it enables
transparency in terms of how decisions taken to alter data collection or processing
protocols shape and guide the materials and insights that result. This approach seeks to
engage with an issue of increasing concern about the extent to which deliberately obscured
algorithms are subtly and imperceptibly crafting what is rendered visible and invisible, and
thus what constitutes knowledge in the social world.8
In terms of performing its data collection functions, the Sentinel platform plugs directly
into social media feeds through free API keys. In relation to this study, this included
Twitter and a series of blogs. The stream of data accessed via this route is ﬁltered by a
series of “channels,” each of which consists of up to 400 linked search terms covering
relevant people, places, problems, and issues. In the process of developing the platform,
several “pre-built” ontologies were developed—usually related to a geographical area, but
in addition, and as happened in relation to the Lee Rigby case, these can be more data-
driven. This combination allows Sentinel to monitor social media through a bottom-up
ontological approach utilising FlexiTerm9 and a top-down set of high-level terms, but
when an event or issue of interest is detected it can be rapidly “tuned” to an event by users
programming in new sets of words and terms as the details about the event in question are
TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 3
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revealed. In this study, the breaking events were picked up on the basis of a pre-built
ontology which was rapidly reﬁned to focus upon key terms associated with the speciﬁcs
of the case including “Woolwich” and “soldier.” As more details became available, a
second “channel” was brought online focusing upon the activities of the English
Defence League as it became quickly clear they were key actors in the unfolding narrative.
Then a third channel with a lot more speciﬁc situational detail was developed and
deployed by the end of the second day.
Figure 1 below plots the volume of social media data in relation to the murder of Lee
Rigby collected via these channels for this study over a six-month period. Plotted onto the
graph are some of the key events that occurred in order that the association between
communication volumes and important developments can be ascertained.
It can be observed that there was a massive spike in the volume of communications
traﬃc on the day of the murder. This fell back, albeit remaining at a comparatively high
level for a couple of weeks. Subsequently, there was a progressive diminution in the levels
of interest, although there were signiﬁcant increases in social media communications
relating to key incidents and events.
Splitting the data into three “streams”—“Woolwich,” “Rigby,” and “EDL”—intimates
aspects of how the public narrative of the incident evolved over time. For instance, the
initial public interest on social media gravitated around the place where the crime
happened—Woolwich—in the absence of any more detailed information. Once the iden-
tity of the victim was established and publicised then “Rigby” became a more important
signiﬁer for the story and became a focal point for the organisation of the public
conversation. However, this ebbed away quite quickly, re-emerging at key points such as
around the funeral (see below). Contrastingly however, the “EDL Channel” demonstrates
a more sustained level of interest and activity according to the graph. Originally this
channel picked up in terms of the volume of activity around 4 hours after the murder, as
members of the EDL sought to mobilise their members, whilst other political groups
Six Month Time-Line
Sentinel Lee Rigby Murder Twitter Corpus
Figure 1. Data volumes timeline.
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opposed to their views engaged in a counter-mobilisation eﬀort. These interactive
dynamics continued for several weeks, as an artefact of how the Far-Right membership
sought to use the Rigby case as a “condensing symbol” via which to project their
ideological agenda.10
As implied by the above, the operationalisation of Sentinel as a research tool took place
in two modes. There was a dynamic “fast-time” mode where, as the case developed over
the ﬁrst few days, the stream of text and image data was being monitored and queried in
“real-time” by members of the research team to get a sense of what was happening, with
interesting occurrences, developments, and accounts being recorded. Importantly, whilst
this fast-time analysis was ongoing, the programme was acting like a digital recorder,
storing relevant material for a slower-time more deliberative analysis in the second mode
of operation.
Full analysis of the data commenced by developing a quantitative overview across the
event as a whole and then, on the basis of the fast-time analysis and other sources (largely
broadcast media and press accounts) identifying the key sub-events in the case narrative
and connecting these to the social media timeline (as plotted on Figure 1 above). Data for
more detailed coding were then sampled at those points where there were signiﬁcant
“spikes” in the volume of social media data, across the twelve-month period covered. The
focus here was on the build-up to and the period of high volume traﬃc. These periods
were divided into 3-hour units and further sub-divided into 15-minute sub-units with the
data relating to these periods of time being screened for interest and relevance. This
involved members from the research team rapidly reading and “screening” around
500,000 Tweets in total and diﬀerentiating those that helped understand the story of the
sub-event in question, or appeared to relate to the conceptual themes emerging to orient
the study overall (see below).
From the resulting dataset, around 17,000 messages were subject to more detailed
axial coding11 including: whether the content was extremist in terms of expressing
Far-Right/Far-Left/Islamist views; the presence of emotional attributes including fear,
anger, shock, revulsion; and whether it could be identiﬁed with a particular group.
This work was undertaken by a small team with regular inter-rater reliability checks,
especially when some new or innovative dimension to the data was identiﬁed. An
additional 2,000 tweets were subject to even more detailed coding to try and obtain
insight into the complex interactional dynamics that were observed as taking place
between diﬀerent ideological positions. By reading large volumes of material, the
researchers were able to detect patterns in the material which were coded and
subsequently used to derive conceptual categories to account for them. This inter-
pretative and sense-making work was framed by several sociological themes that had
been deﬁned as pivotal to the intellectual orientations of the study, including: issues
of “conﬂict dynamics”;12 the literature on processes of social reaction emanating from
symbolic interactionist sociology;13 the social psychology of risk perceptions and
rumours;14 and how and why some events function as “signal crimes” that re-orient
the institutional and interactional ordering of reality.15 It is through this blended
approach of conceptually-driven and data-driven interrogation of the data collected
that the ten conceptual categories reported in this article were derived. As such, the
data reported in this study are representative and illustrative of broader patterns and
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trends, selected on the grounds that they are especially “luminous,” in the sense that
Katz16 uses the term, of some of the principal conceptual interests of this article.
An important ﬁnding of this qualitative coding eﬀort was that approximately 20% of
the Twitter messages that the data collection algorithms had identiﬁed as connected to the
Rigby case actually emanated from several previous conﬂicts, in particular the Boston
Bombing that had taken place some months earlier. This is of considerable import for
more quantitative analyses17 on the grounds that the data they are processing may actually
contain a lot of “noise,” in terms of including communications relating to other similar
but distinct events, thereby decreasing the accuracy of the statistical models being
developed.
One further aspect worth noting with respect to some of the sub-events was the
integration of attempts to validate what happened and why through recourse to external
datasets. This included, for example, accessing recorded hate crime data supplied by the
Metropolitan Police Service to check an apparent association identiﬁed through the social
media analysis between the occurrence of extreme language and reports of hate violence
towards Muslims.
Social reactions to crime and terrorism
In his case study account of the social impact of, and reaction to, the 1991 assault by Los
Angeles Police Department oﬃcers on Rodney King, Jacobs18 made two important gen-
eralizable points with respect to the study of social reactions to crime. First, he notes a
general failure to attend to the impact of speciﬁc and deﬁned events with any rigour.
Second, there is, he posits, a tendency to portray public reactions in an overly homo-
genized fashion, neglecting the extent to which diﬀerently situated segments of a popula-
tion can interpret the same event very diﬀerently.
Studies of the processes of social reaction to major crimes and associated issues have
been dominated by two key theoretical perspectives: a) moral panics; and b) the fear of
crime. There have of course been other contributions, pivoting around more socio-
psychological ideas, but in terms of exerting a sustained gravitational inﬂuence upon the
study of social reactions to crime, such accounts have achieved far less traction than the
concepts of moral panic and fear of crime.
In his original formulation of moral panics, Cohen19 was concerned with setting out the
politico-cultural processes via which, when subject to troubling or concerning episodes
and events, key institutions of the state engaged in forms of collaborative collective action
via which a sense of order was reasserted and potential risks or threats neutralised. It is a
mode of analysis that has subsequently been picked up, adapted, and applied widely by
scholars addressing a diverse range of social problems, including gang violence20 and
terrorism.21 In setting out his theoretical frame, Cohen was precise in specifying what
conditions did and did not qualify as a de facto moral panic. He was clear it required a
threat stimulus posing a normative challenge to the extant ordering of reality. In this
sense, it was not just the ramiﬁcations of a nasty or vicious act—rather a perceived threat
had to be imbued with wider symbolic meaning. Cohen was equally adamant that a sense
of “panic” had to be induced, deﬁned as an intense, relatively short-lived sense of
irrational concern and anxiety. Of particular relevance to terrorism is that whilst evoking
6 M. INNES ET AL.
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panic was not part of the intent of the youth subculture that Cohen was interested in, such
extreme aﬀective reactions are the aspiration of terrorist groups.
The second core inﬂuence upon studies of social reactions to crime and disorder has
been the concept of fear of crime. The vast number of studies of fear of crime can be
diﬀerentiated according to whether they position fear as a “cause” of other issues and
problems, or as a “consequence” to be reduced and managed.22 Although there have been
a number of studies utilising qualitative research instruments to attend to fear of crime as
a deﬁned form of social reaction, these are dwarfed in number by those based upon cross-
sectional analyses of large-scale structured surveys.23
These methodological considerations are important inasmuch as they point to how the
issues and problems that are highlighted and privileged in social scientiﬁc studies are
derivatives of the methods used. As Hacking24 amongst many others has argued, the
methods deployed in our studies are simultaneously “ways of seeing and not seeing.” That
is, they inherently and ineluctably guide analytic attention towards some aspects of a
setting or situation. This is especially true in terms of understanding fear of crime and
moral panics as forms of social reaction, but even more so when attending to the inﬂuence
of social media on the contemporary dynamics and mechanics of social reaction.
Especially given how the algorithms that process these data and impose an ordering of
reality upon them are functioning as profound new instruments of social perception,
selectively steering collective attention towards some matters and away from others.25
Innes26 suggests, with respect to the former in particular, it is noticeable that fear of
crime has tended to be treated and studied as an aggregated artefact of levels of crime,
rather than as an attributable consequence of individual incidents. This is because tradi-
tional research methodologies have proven prohibitively expensive and insuﬃciently agile
to aﬀord the opportunity to study the impact and eﬀects of individual crimes with
suﬃcient levels of validity and reliability. Indeed, the study of social reactions has been
curtailed by the fact that, in terms of collecting “high-resolution” and ﬁne-grained data,
the orthodox and established research methodologies are just not up to the task. However,
the premise of this article is that this is a limitation that “big” social media datasets have
the potential to overcome.27
The analysis of these data identiﬁed ten distinct components of social reaction: report-
ing; requesting; responding; recruiting; “risking”; retaliating; rumouring; reheating;
remembering; and “resiliencing.” These will now be addressed in turn.
Reporting
Ohhhh myyy God! I just seen a man with his head chopped oﬀ right in front of my eyes!
Woolwich (14:09, 22 May 2013)28
Shortly after, this witness at the scene used Twitter to report the police shooting the two
suspects as follows:
Oh my God. The way the Feds took them out! It was a female police oﬃcer, she come out the
whip and just started bussing shots (14:17, 22 May 2013)
Before sending a further message that ﬁlled in some important details about what he
had witnessed:
TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 7
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The two black bredas run this white guy over then hop out the car and start chopping mans
head oﬀ with machete! HellsEmpty (14:20, 22 May 2013)
This sequence of messages clearly captures one of the key behaviours enacted by social
media users in the aftermath of signiﬁcant events—reporting to others what they have
seen and heard via public and semi-public platforms. In addition to this individual, others
in the vicinity to the crime also broadcast written descriptions, and others used the
cameras on their mobile devices to capture and transmit images of what was happening.
These tweets and associated images of the assailants at the scene with blood-soaked hands
and carrying meat-cleavers had a profound impact upon how the incident was subsequently
reported by national press and broadcast media.29 Indeed, the tweeter of the messages
reproduced above was contacted directly via Twitter by journalists within an hour, oﬀering
him money for pictures and rights to his tweets. This is symptomatic of a new media ecology
whereby citizens at the scene of a crime are not just witnesses in a legal sense, but enmeshed in
the reporting of such events to the wider world. By the end of May 22nd, the messages
mentioned above had been re-tweeted 11,000 times and had been cited in nearly 34,000 other
social media posts. A second online response to the images being tweeted from the scene came
from the Metropolitan Police Twitter account asking people not to disseminate images from
the scene on the basis that they might identify their SO19 ﬁrearms oﬃcers.
Similar forms of “reporting” behaviour via social media were evident throughout the
dataset, whenever important events or developments occurred. However, it is worth
dwelling a little more on how news was “broken” about the principal crime, as such
patterns may have especially profound implications. For prior to the mass availability of
social media platforms on mobile technologies, most such public stories relied on breaking
events coming to the notice of journalists who would be dispatched to the scene. In the
case of broadcast media this would also involve getting a camera crew to the scene. This
eﬀort very frequently meant that by the time the media were present, police ﬁrst response
procedures were well under way, and they had established a degree of control over the
scene and who had access to it. Contrastingly, what the above data convey is how an
eyewitness directly observing the unfolding of events is broadcasting updates about the
crime and initial police response to it in almost real-time.30
Inevitably this has implications for the social control work of police responding to
terrorist incidents. For the speed of communication that is involved fundamentally chal-
lenges some of the core standard operating procedures used by the police to guide their
initial response to critical incidents. Through their training, police are encouraged to think
in terms of there being a “golden hour” at the start of an investigation, which is critical in
determining the quality and quantity of evidence available to any criminal investigation. As
such, police ﬁrst responders need to establish control of the scene of the crime. This sense of
control encompasses both who is allowed access once the area is “sealed,” and equally
importantly, what information about the crime is made available, and when.31 In the
Association of Chief Police Oﬃcer’s “Murder Investigation Manual”32 the imposition of a
sense of control, during what are often confused and initially fairly chaotic social situations,
is a permeating narrative. For example, a key part of the investigative strategy is to use press
brieﬁngs and conferences to release information to the public. In terms of these kinds of
implications therefore, rather than the increasingly over-used notion of “big data,” it may be
more insightful for police to think in terms of “fast data.”
8 M. INNES ET AL.
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What can be observed in relation to the materials emanating from the scene of the
Rigby murder is just how diﬃcult information control has been rendered in a social media
era. “Crime scenes” have become more permeable than they were in the past, with details
being reported directly into the public sphere about aspects of what has happened. In this
case, there was an almost contemporaneous reporting of unfolding events.
Requesting
Accompanying the use of social media by citizens to report were ongoing requests for
information or updates about what was occurring. Often these kinds of requests came
initially from people who were not quite in the right place at the right time to be able to
report what happened, but who picked up on a range of signiﬁers in their situated
environment, connoting that something might have occurred. They immediately used
their social network to try and ascertain what might be transpiring. This is exempliﬁed by
the following Tweet:
What happened on John Wilson Street?!?! (Woolwich) (14:39, 22 May 2013)
This and several other similar requests around this point in time set up an intriguing “call
and response” online interactional sequence, with the requests being met with (as it turns
out) fairly accurate reports:
someone just got stabbed by two guys down Woolwich (14:40)
Across the dataset as a whole, for all the key developments and events associated with
the killing and its aftermath, it was observed that social media played an important role in
enabling these reporting and requesting sequences. So that as more details started to reach
more people, the nature of the requests being made via Twitter and other social media
platforms evolved and eﬀectively matured as people were searching for more valid and
reliable sources:
Anyone with any ‘veriﬁed’ info on what happened in Woolwich? (15:11)
Here it can be observed that the request has moved on from being “any” information
about what is transpiring in Woolwich—as this was now circulating—to materials that can
be interpreted with some conﬁdence.
What emerges from analysis of these reporting and requesting sequences of behaviour
is just how eﬀective they are in piecing together a reasonable deﬁnition of the situation,
with several members across the social network sharing accurate information about a
rapidly unfolding event. It was also notable that oﬃcial sources did not respond to any of
these requests for information; in the ﬁrst few hours, it was an informal eﬀort. In sum, the
availability of social media data enables a detailed account to be reconstructed of how, in
the ﬁrst few hours after the terrorist attack, there was a confused and chaotic form of
public sense-making, where social media functioned as an important informational
resource for members of the public in the local area.
TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 9
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Responding and recruiting
As details about what had happened in Woolwich were more widely shared and broadcast,
so there was a detectable shift in the predominant patterns of communication. This
involved a move from Twitter users requesting information to an articulation of their
emotional, cognitive, and behavioural responses to the news of the attempted beheading.
Initially, the emotional tenor of these responses pivoted around expressions of shock and
horror, which later evolved into anger and fear.
A second group of “responses” identiﬁed in the data were in fact responses to messages
put out by the authorities and political leaders about the event. Many of these “responses
to the responses” engaged in forms of commentary and critique of what was being
conveyed. It was observed with respect to both categories of responses some communica-
tions were translated into attempts to “recruit” people into participating in speciﬁc actions
and/or groups.
That terrorist acts are designed to function as “propaganda by deed” is now well
established.33 It is accepted that the intent of those launching terrorist attacks is to sustain
and embolden the commitment of their core support, and attract those whose support is
“softer” in its constitution. In the datatset collected after the murder of Lee Rigby, whilst
there was some evidence of these kinds of activity being undertaken by Islamist groups,
this did not make up a substantial proportion of the data overall. Far more of the
“recruiting” activities detected were undertaken by Far-Right and Hard-Left groups trying
to mobilise potential participants in collective action events. Thus “recruiting” is used here
in a fairly catholic sense. It does not just involve formally joining or aligning to a deﬁned
membership group, but can involve sympathising with an ideological viewpoint, expres-
sions of solidarity for a group, and ideally direct involvement with them.
The instigation of recruiting activity can be observed occurring quite rapidly after the attack
on Fusilier Rigby. By 18:00, social media channels were being used by representatives of the
English Defence League and allied groups to organise a protest on the streets of Woolwich that
night. Deploying a rhetoric of outrage and what Collins34 dubs “righteous anger,” growing
numbers of messages were being sent calling for established EDL members and any “fellow
travellers” to their ideas to meet in Woolwich at 21:00 to mount a public demonstration.
From an analytic point of view, the intriguing aspect of the recruiting process is how it
triggered a counter-mobilisation eﬀort amongst Left-Wing and anti-Fascist groups.
Monitoring the public social media traﬃc via which the Right-Wing recruiting calls
were being made, a perceived threat was detected which led those of a diﬀerent political
persuasion to launch their own recruitment drive urging those sympathetic to their views
to mobilise in opposition:
@Oﬃcial_EDL: CAN ANYONE THAT CAN GET THERE GET TO WOOLWICH NOW!!!!
(21:20)
#STOP #EDL THEY HAVE SENT A CALL OUT TO GET PEOPLE TO #WOOLWICH
#LONDON. Many members are talking about retaliation https://t.co/1PsGS8R7k0 (21:27)
It is clear that social media has become an important recruitment tool for a range of
groups, who use it to try and persuade both known members and those sympathetic to
their views, to involve themselves in collective actions in dynamic and rapidly developing
events. It is also evident how data derived from these sources provide nuanced insight into
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the emergence of conﬂict dynamics in the aftermath of terrorist atrocities, and the ways
that constructions of diﬀerent threats function as stimuli for particular recruitment eﬀorts.
“Risking”
A key category of communications in the dataset comprises messages intended to either
amplify or mitigate the perceived risks arising in the aftermath of the incident. A
conceptual distinction can be drawn between social media communications that were
seeking to: a) anticipate and “rehearse” likely developments; b) purposively increase the
level of risk through, for example, deploying hate-ﬁlled and highly emotive language; and,
c) reassure and mitigate the public perceptions of risks using social media.
What might be termed “rehearsing” behaviours were forms of communicative action
used to anticipate and make predictions about what was likely to happen next. On the ﬁrst
evening for example, a number of those commenting on the unfolding events, at least as
they appeared across social media platforms, were rehearsing that the reaction to the
killings of Lee Rigby were likely to involve further problems and violence:
This beheading, if it is to a serving soldier and by non-white persons, is going to be a
propaganda goldmine for the EDL and UKIP (17:20)
There will be a response no matter who ever the identities of those responsible are, This
disgraceful act cannot be ignored (17:38)
Frightening that EDL are calling for ‘revenge’ after #Woolwich attack (17:40)
These rehearsals came to the fore around moments where key events were happening
and especially when community tensions were elevated.
Distinct from these kinds of communication, there were messages whose content
seemed explicitly designed to amplify perceptions of risk and crisis:
OF COURE #EDL will capitalise on this! More Hate Attacks, More retaliatory crimes.
WELCOME TO HELL! #UK #WOOLWICH (17.46)
Typically, as with this message, these risk-amplifying tweets used inﬂammatory and
extreme rhetoric, to “prepare the ground” for a shift to retaliatory behaviours and
conduct. Opposed to these risk amplifying communications were messages from the
police and other political and civil society leaders, intended to mitigate these, and reassure
about the actual levels of risk.
Retaliating
Both of the previous two behaviours were eﬀectively foreshadowing a move to retribution
and retaliation. This is the sixth “R” in our analysis. As is evident from the preceding
sections, social media plays an important role in terms of the social organisation of moves
towards retaliation. Equally however, it provides a useful documentary record of retalia-
tion events when they occur.
In their recent article on the aftermath of the Lee Rigby attack, Williams and Burnap35
attend to how the killing elicited outrage that in turn occasioned a signiﬁcant increase in
levels of online “cyberhate” in the ﬁrst day following the murder. Consistent with the
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thrust of their argument, the present analysis also identiﬁed a rapid pick-up of hate crimes
and sentiments being conveyed via social media. However, where they focused upon
quantiﬁed measures of these emotions, we think it important to understand the content
of what is being communicated. This is on the grounds that, within the aggregated
messages, there are some that are especially important and inﬂuential in seeding the
move from communicational retaliation to physical retaliatory violence. For example,
through the detailed qualitative coding of tweets drawn from the initial reaction phases,
the following message was identiﬁed as being highly signiﬁcant:
@Oﬃcial_EDL: ****CONFIRMED WE HAVE BEEN SUBJECT TO A TERROR ATTACK
BY ISLAM, WE ARE CURRENTLY UNDER ATTACK**** (18:06)
Broadcast via the EDL’s oﬃcial Twitter account, this raised the stakes—seeking to estab-
lish a new deﬁnition of the situation. It was a deliberate attempt to frame the events in
Woolwich in a way legitimising retaliatory action. There then followed a number of
messages from this account and other associated ones seeking to mobilise and organise
a collective dimension to the retaliation:
EDL leader Tommy Robinson on way to Woolwich now, Take to the streets peeps ENOUGH
IS ENOUGH (18:26)
@Oﬃcial_EDL: Message from Tommy—Feet on the streets anyone want to go to Woolwich
contact him/me, he will be there around 9pm (18:59)
Some of these messages were trying to co-ordinate a collective mobilisation eﬀort, whilst
others were explicitly seeking to escalate the emotional “heat” of those exposed to these
communications:
Its time we had a national shoot a paki day and have it every year at £5 a head(money to
charity) cull them (18:15)
I HOPE THE EDL COME AND KILL THESE WANKERS ALL OF THEM. #woolwich #EDL
(18:16)
The ﬁrst two messages in this sequence probably constitute hate crimes in their own
right. However, the EDL mobilisation eﬀort to get “feet on the streets” that evening
was not very successful. Only a relatively small number of EDL supporters congregated
in Woolwich, but according to reports on social media contained within our dataset
they were signiﬁcantly outnumbered by the police presence and were rapidly
dispersed.
This points to a key policy and practice decision for police in terms of the consequence
management of terrorist attacks. How much should they focus upon managing online
versus oﬄine reactions, especially given how in such circumstances their capacity and
capability is stretched anyway? Importantly what transpired with respect to the Rigby case,
it was actually not in the ﬁrst twenty-four hours that the most egregious instances of
retaliatory physical violence took place. Rather these kinds of repercussions occurred in
the days following. Indeed, the reaction pattern in terms of actual hate-inspired violence
appeared to conform to Randall Collins’36 model of conﬂict dynamics. Collins presciently
identiﬁes that it is once the initial shock of an attack has passed that the potential for
further violence becomes most acute.
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Rumouring
Research on the functions of social media across a range of social settings and situations
has identiﬁed that it plays an important role in disseminating rumours about unfolding
events, some of which turn out to be accurate whilst others are false. In his seminal work
on rumours, Shibutani37 classed them as forms of “improvised news” that are brought
forward when important developments are occurring about which there is a lack of
reliable and veriﬁable information. Developing this line of thinking, Innes38 conceptua-
lizes rumours as “soft facts”—that is information whose provenance is uncertain and the
content of which may be remoulded and updated as time passes.
In the ﬁrst few hours after the killing, spurred on by the reporting of eyewitnesses in
the vicinity of the crime scene, much of the social media commentary was attributed the
status of rumour. In keeping with the conceptual deﬁnitions outlined above, these were
not totally false, but neither were they capturing the full picture:
Madness outside Woolwich library, some kid got stabbed and then the killers got shot by
police:O (14:45)
My god 3boys and 1 solider just shot dead in Woolwich seriously what is this world coming
2!!! (14:57)
so apparently someone got their head cut oﬀ in Woolwich?! Please say that’s a sick joke!
What the hell is this country coming too??!! (14:58)
For days and weeks afterwards, as new developments in understanding what had
transpired in Woolwich emerged, rumours continued to swirl about on social media.
Some of these were inﬂections of fully formed conspiracy theories, whilst others were
remarkably accurate. Of particular note in this regard was the fact that rumours about the
identity of the two killers emerged on social media several hours before appearing in the
broadcast media or press.
Remembering and reheating
As the process of social reaction evolved and developed in relation to some of the events
and occurrences outlined previously, so a number of acts of “remembering” were evident
across the social media platforms including Facebook and Twitter. Some of these were
large-scale and bound up in the construction of the collective memory of the killing,
pivoting around key rituals such as the funeral of the victim, as described more fully in the
next section.39 But prior to this, there were more individualized recollections and remem-
brances that seeded these more collective memories. For example, those who knew Lee
Rigby, such as his commanding oﬃcer in the army, provided accounts of him that were
circulated and shared widely.
Although not a large component of the overall social media traﬃc, some of the
messages analysed indicate how attempts were being made to use Twitter to disseminate
propaganda. This was clearly evident in the communications activity of representatives of
established Islamist groups, who sought to celebrate and justify the killing. Similar eﬀorts
were also evident in the activities of other participants in the social media conversation.
For instance, variations on the following theme were detected repeatedly:
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#woolwich attack. This is war. First gang raping our children now beheading people on the
streets of south London in broad daylight #EDL (18:18)
Evident here is a process of connecting the most recent atrocity event to a previously
established litany of social problems that can be attributed to the perceived “enemy.”
Reheating prior grievances in this way is a device for “stitching” the latest atrocity into a
wider and more well-established narrative. This serves two functions from the point of
view of those involved. First, the most recent event in the sequence of grievances that form
the overarching narrative serves as an “evidential warrant” for the more generalised claims
that the narrative sets out. Second, the established narrative implicitly steers and justiﬁes
the attribution of blame to particular groups. This is accomplished by setting out addi-
tional examples of where other problematic behaviours by members of the group under
suspicion have been identiﬁed. Of course, the validity and reliability of such narratives and
interpretations is often contested. But that is not the point. For people with an established
viewpoint and ideological perspective, reheating past atrocities to connect them to more
recent events serves to further instantiate their values and views.
“Resiliencing”
Within the academic and policy literature on terrorism, there has been increasing interest
in the concept of individual and community resilience.40 The preponderance of this
attention has focused upon social-psychological factors that function to insulate people
from the inﬂuence of terrorist ideologies and narratives. But opening up the concept of
resilience to look a bit more widely, it has also been used to capture qualities that help
mitigate the social impact of disasters on urban areas and communities.41 Blending aspects
of these two conceptualisations, in the current dataset, there are several examples where
social media communications were being used to design and organise a range of activities
intended to constrain the social consequences of the murder. This work of mobilising
groups to demonstrate and enact “pro-social” responses to the presence of risk and threat
can be, somewhat inelegantly labeled “resiliencing.”
A clear example of this kind of behaviour pivoted around the funeral of Lee Rigby. In
the context of a process of social reaction marked by multiple secondary conﬂicts and
periods of considerable community tension, events around the funeral played an impor-
tant symbolic role. As well as more oﬃcial communications from senior political and
establishment ﬁgures, many ordinary people sought to use social media channels to
convey condolences and respect. Taken as a whole, many of these messages were suﬀused
with tones of salute, patriotism, and importantly, solidarity:
Lee Rigby. You have united this country. You will be remembered with dignity. Your
comrades and countrymen salute you. Rest in peace . . ..hero (10:00)
On the morning of the funeral a Twitter campaign began to build calling for two minutes
of silence to be observed at 11:00. Individuals and businesses nationwide posted their
support and at one point someone tried to convert this into a Twitter silence by suggesting
people post a particular hash tag to represent the act. These collective displays of solidarity
and remembrance have been noted before, particularly post 9/11. Such displays, as
Cialdini42 has argued, work as “social proof” of collective solidarity and resilience.
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An especially important “condensing symbol” in these collective expressions of remem-
bering, solidarity, and resilience that blended together and traversed oﬄine and online
behaviours, was performed by an image of Lee Rigby’s son at his father’s funeral. A picture
of him wearing a t-shirt with the words “My Daddy My Hero” was re-tweeted hundreds of
times in the following few hours.
As had been widely reported, his father was wearing a “Help For Heroes” T-shirt at the
time of his murder. Indeed, one of the earliest public displays of symbolic resilience
following the murder involved large numbers of people trying to purchase “Help for
Heroes” t-shirts from the charity concerned, after this fact was reported. It is notable that
similar public rituals of “associative resilience” can be observed in response to other more
recent terrorist incidents. For example, the widespread uptake of the “Je suis Charlie”
moniker on social media and as a t-shirt slogan following the events in Paris in 2015 has a
very similar feel to it.
Prior to the public memorialisation associated with the funeral, there had been multiple
examples of resilience being enacted, often involving collective civil society actions to
control and curtail prospects of retaliatory violence and public disorder by members of
Right-Wing political groups.
In the days and weeks following the murder there were a number of media reports
from around the country of serious violence against members of the Muslim faith and
against several mosques. Community tensions were running high. One story however, “cut
through” this general climate of unease and concern. It told of how tensions relating to an
EDL march in York had been diﬀused when local mosque members had talked with the
marchers over a cup of tea, and a friendly game of football had ensued. This story was
picked up by many national media outlets and was repeatedly recounted by journalists. It
became almost iconic in the narrative of the Lee Rigby murder, conveying how commu-
nity impacts were being managed and a sense of order restored. For implicit in the
narrative worked up by the journalists was the idea of how symbols of English identity
(a cup of tea and biscuits, and football) were eﬀective at diﬀusing the potential for conﬂict.
However, analysis of the communications on Twitter surrounding this event suggest that
the reality of what happened was rather diﬀerent from the mediated narrative.
On May 23, 2013, the day after the murder in Woolwich, and after a night of EDL
disturbances with the police, the message displayed in Figure 2 appeared on the
Scarborough EDL Division Facebook page.
This protest was planned for the day following a large demonstration planned for
Newcastle, and there was another scheduled for the day after on Downing Street. This may
explain why only ﬁve supporters attended on May 26, from a division capable of ﬁelding
many more. The EDL support that did attend was signiﬁcantly out-numbered by the
Figure 2. Message on the Scarborough EDL Division Facebook page.
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counter-protest that was mobilised. The Facebook post by the Scarborough division of the
EDL on the 23rd had acted as a source of alarm for some Twitter users, given the febrile
and tense atmosphere across the country more generally. Consequently, on the day of the
demonstration between 100 and 150 local people and students gathered at the mosque
named by the EDL, to show their solidarity and counter any actions staged by the EDL.
Given the large diﬀerences in numbers on the two sides, it is perhaps unsurprising that the
small number of EDL activists preferred to have a cup of tea and play football.
Analysis of the data collected via Twitter suggests that the counter-mobilisation eﬀort
was scaﬀolded by a pre-existing social network established between the mosque and
students and staﬀ of York University. Social media platforms were important commu-
nications vehicles for getting the message out. This is consistent with Sampson’s43 recent
revisions to his theory of collective eﬃcacy, where he identiﬁes that local institutional
infrastructures are important in performing some of the “heavy lifting” required to resolve
what are otherwise fairly intractable structural issues.
On Saturday the 25th of May the University of York’s student newspaper, which is
published online and in print, ran a story entitled “Twitter raises fears of York EDL
rally.”44 The piece quoted the Facebook post above, and stated an anti-EDL protest was
being organised that also involved the University’s Amnesty International section and
Student Union.
Details about the counter-action were widely re-tweeted. On the morning of the
planned EDL demonstration, Twitter traﬃc repeatedly reiterated an invitation to
participate:
The #York community has been invited for tea at York Mosque (Bull Lane) today from 2pm
to stand up to EDL threats. Pls RT
YORK PEOPLE: Bull Lane Mosque, just oﬀ Lawrence Street has received threats of an EDL
action. A counter-demo is assembling.
When the handful of EDL members did arrive outside the mosque to be greeted by a
much larger crowd of people, members of the latter group used Twitter and other social
media platforms to engage in “reporting” behaviour designed to capture the resilience
being demonstrated by local communities:
At #YorkMosque the EDL (we assume) have just appeared. Everything calm. They’re about to
be invited to tea.
Some EDL at #Yorkmosque. All peaceful now. Tea and biscuits with the fascists. Oh #york.
Opposed by 100–150 supporters of the mosque, the 4–6 EDL supporters were invited in
for tea. A number of tweets and blogs carried a picture of a female EDL supporter taking a
cup of tea from a member of the mosque congregation. Later the supporters and
protesters dispersed peacefully. It was only after everything had dispersed at the scene
that the construction of what would become the public narrative started to become
evident. That evening, several tweets put a very diﬀerent spin on the event. There was
no mention of the tiny EDL turn out. Bearing in mind there had been hundreds of EDL
supporters in Newcastle the day before, one might be forgiven for believing that a
signiﬁcant defeat had somehow been wrought by the liberal application of tea and cake:
Amazing rumours that the EDL has been thwarted in York by a Tea party hosted by the
Mosque. Bloody love my home town
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#EDL showed up for a rally outside a York mosque today only to ﬁnd 100 locals deﬁantly
sipping tea and eating cake.
These tweets cleverly invoked a quintessential symbol of Britishness—a tea party—and
link it with the mosque. It implicitly conveys a sense of how a very diﬀerent faith tradition
has been integrated within the local rituals and rhythms of life in Yorkshire. A symbol of
Britishness was mobilised to manage a potential threat to community relations.
These passages and the social media data extracts embedded within them help to
capture how social media communications are increasingly important in doing the work
of organising resilience eﬀorts. More conceptually, and equally intriguing, is the display of
how the ampliﬁcation of the perceived threat through a febrile mix of communications
and communicators actually served to inﬂate the implicit signiﬁcance of the resilient
response that is performed. This was such a good story that it served to convey powerful
messages about levels of integration and cohesion at a stressful time. Ultimately, we have
not been able to ascertain whether this was happenstance or a quite brilliant propaganda
initiative. Either way, it does suggest some potentially important lessons for what might
work in responding to major terrorist incidents in the future.
Conclusion
Terrorist attacks engage communicative violence designed to induce speciﬁc eﬀects in the
public audience.45 They seek to terrorise, polarize, and mobilize. For the general public,
the intent is to evoke feelings of shock, horror, and fear. With respect to those groups
whose social identities and interests the perpetrators of the violence purport to represent,
the motivation is to polarize opinion—to establish which members of the wider commu-
nities are “with us” or “against us.” And then ﬁnally, it is anticipated that the attack will
lead to mobilization. This includes encouraging others to commit subsequent acts of
violence, but also instigating conﬂict by pressuring opponents into a response.
Given the purpose of terrorist violence is to drive social reactions in this way, it is
perhaps surprising that more work has not attended to the issue of how far and fast public
reactions to terrorist attacks “travel.” It is not that there are no such studies, but rather
they are comparatively few and relatively weak in terms of the empirical evidence
provided in terms of capturing the dynamics of social reaction across space and time.
Through a case study of the aftermath of the terrorist murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby in
2013, this article has identiﬁed ten speciﬁc online behaviours with oﬄine consequences
that collectively constituted the reaction process. Derived from qualitative analysis of
social media data, the ﬁndings reported help to demonstrate how the availability of such
materials aﬀord new and creative ways to study the aftermath of terrorism and other
major events to illuminate hitherto largely invisible aspects of how and why processes of
social reaction take the form they do. For whilst there is a strong tradition across the
Social Sciences of studying social reactions to major crimes and disasters, the insights that
have been oﬀered to date have been constrained by limitations associated with more
orthodox and established methods. Surveys of public opinions and perceptions, for
instance, can provide a “snapshot” of public attitudes at one moment in time, but it is
diﬃcult to trace how such attitudes develop and evolve via such research instruments.
Equally, more qualitative approaches, such as those utilised by Slucka,46 aﬀord a sense of
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how perceptions and attitudes bend in response to diﬀerent events and interventions.
However, the views ascertained pertain to only small groups of people.
By casting social media data as “digital traces” of social action, it is possible to use them
to reconstruct a ﬁne-grained understanding of what happened and why, and the ways in
which diﬀerent segments of the public interpreted these developments. As such, they
enable new “ways of seeing” with respect to processes of social reaction to major terrorist
attacks, providing digital indicators of how large numbers of people who are members of
particular social media communities thought, felt, and behaved in relation to various
developments in the aftermath of the attack. As with all research methodologies it has its
strengths and limitations. But we are conﬁdent in asserting that it is an approach that has
framed the most rigorous and intensive investigation into what happens in the aftermath
of terrorist atrocity events yet conducted.
A key insight derived concerns the complex and somewhat chaotic nature of public
sense-making and interpretation that arises in the aftermath of a terrorist attack.
Sociologists routinely invoke concepts of the “deﬁnition of the situation” to conﬁgure
an approach to understanding who did what to whom and why, in terms of private
troubles and public issues. However, discussion of such matters typically takes place when
the deﬁnition is relatively settled. The unique value of the kinds of data available to this
study was the capacity they aﬀorded for tracking and tracing how the process of deﬁning
the incident unfolds and evolves over time in high-resolution detail. Moreover, they
render observable the moments where innovations in public understandings are ﬁrst
brought forward and sometimes contested.
Police investigators have become accustomed to talking about “the golden hour” for
major investigations, wherein their ﬁrst responders have an opportunity to establish
physical and informational control of the scene and what comes out of it. However,
with witnesses at the scene providing “live” reports of what is happening, the level of
control available to police appears increasingly limited.
A related implication for counter-terrorism practice concerns the role of social media in
the organization of retaliation and secondary conﬂicts. For it captures the complexities of
the reaction patterns that are performed by the diﬀerent actors who engage in the aftermath
of atrocity events. Analysis of the data collected shows how Far-Right groups sought to
respond to the murder of Lee Rigby by organizing protests across the country, but in turn
their mobilization eﬀorts were met with counter-mobilizations from a coalition of anti-
Fascist and Left-Wing political groups. The ability to observe, in ﬁne-grained detail, the
interplay and interactions between these groups in states of heightened tension has con-
siderable potential to enhance the ability to anticipate and degrade conﬂict dynamics in such
situations. Signiﬁcantly, whilst the murder of Lee Rigby was deﬁned as an act inspired by
Islamist terrorist ideologies, much of the secondary conﬂict elicited did not involve groups
supporting such perspectives. This is important learning for the future in terms of under-
standing how and why such incidents impact upon community tensions and cohesion.
Understanding who does what in terms of the consequences that follow from a major
terrorist attack, and how these contributions interact and interface with each other, is
important in managing the extent that these incidents fulﬁll the intent of their authors to
impact upon the public audience. This has been a neglected aspect of terrorism studies.
There has been a clear and understandable preference to fund and deliver knowledge that
might assist in preventing individuals from acquiring the motivations to engage in violence,
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pre-empting their actions when they do and providing explanations as to why they do so.
However, in a situation where the capability to prevent all plots and attacks from occurring
appears unrealistic and the police and security agencies anticipate failing to do so on a
minority of occasions, it does seem reasonable to ask “what research evidence is there about
how to eﬀectively manage the consequences of such attacks when they do occur?”
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